

# Graph Analysis for forensics analysis

Security-Systems Summer Week 2023

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# Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity

*Challenge:*

*Detecting complex attacks in dynamic digital environments  
generating huge data volumes*


Protecting Data, protecting through data, Unistra/TPS

ML & Security, EPITA SCIA

Trusted IA, EPITA ING1

*Teaching*

# Artificial Intelligence AGAINST cybersecurity ?





# AI for Cybersecurity

## Research challenges


How to **model** attacks for an explicable and transferable detection ?

How to **detect** complex, multi-step attacks in system traces ?

How to **learn** new attacks to adapt analysis and prepare reaction ?

And how graphs can bring a solution ?

# Running example: UNSW IoT Botnet detection



**Bot-IoT Dataset:** Koroniotis, Nickolaos, et al. "Towards developing network forensic mechanism for botnet activities in the IoT based on machine learning techniques." *Mobile Networks and Management: 9th International Conference, MONAMI 2017, Melbourne, Australia, December 13-15, 2017, Proceedings 9*. Springer International Publishing, 2018.


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Elsayed, Nelly, Zag ElSayed, and Magdy Bayoumi. "IoT Botnet Detection Using an Economic Deep Learning Model." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.02013* (2023).

# Modeling

# Technical Properties of Graphs

→ Towards trusted graphs






# Expert Knowledge

## At the origin where ... attack graphs


### Modeling



Example Attack Graph

#### Attack graphs for vulnerability analysis


- Formalism for attack representation
- Patterns for Intrusion Detection Systems
- Enable to share knowledge visually



Alternative Attack Scenario Avoiding the IDS

Sheyner, Oleg Mikhail. Scenario graphs and attack graphs. Carnegie Mellon University, 2004.

# Attack graphs: Limitations




Vulnerability Analysis of a Network is a tedious process

- Time costly
- Error prone
- Non-transferable

The meta-model has gone more complex



- Some automation
- Still relying on expert knowledge
  - A lot of manual documentation
  - Highly dependant on third party knowledge bases
- Tool not available
- Analysis tool uncoupled from detection or reaction capability



Hankin, Chris, and Pasquale Malacaria. "Attack Dynamics: An Automatic Attack Graph Generation Framework Based on System Topology, CAPEC, CWE, and CVE Databases." *Computers & Security* 123 (2022): 102938.

# An example with graphs:

## Spoofing



*WUSTL-EHMS-2020 testbed*

<https://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/ehms/index.html>

Hady, Anar A., et al. "Intrusion detection system for healthcare systems using medical and network data: A comparison study." *IEEE Access* 8 (2020): 106576-106584.

# Modeling



## Pattern extraction through Cybergraph tool

**Cybergraph**

<https://gitlab.cri.epita.fr/laboratoires/lse/research-devs/cybergraph>

**Graphseclearn**

<https://gitlab.cri.epita.fr/laboratoires/lse/research-devs/graphseclearn>



### Graph structural queries

- Man in the Middle and Island Hopping
- Uses GQL requests
- Low hanging fruits and dangerous patterns (but not necessarily malicious)


# Detection

# The baseline: Detection with Machine Learning

Visualisation of UNSW-IoT-Botnet

## Machine learning



- (Somewhat) stable knowledge corpus
- (not so) widely deployed
- Relies on paquet features (or any punctual data)
- Unable to consider connections between machines
- Unable to go beyond projection of past events






# Learning




## Key features of ML for cybersecurity



**Detection performance**




**Time performance**



**Detection trade-offs**

# Hard points



# Open questions

What about:


Interactions ?

Scalability ?

Novel attacks ?

# Graph Learning: Embedding

## Principles



Xu, Mengjia. "Understanding graph embedding methods and their applications." *SIAM Review* 63.4 (2021): 825-853.


### Embeddings

- Node2Vec, Graph2Vec, GraphSage
- Takes the neighborhood into account
- *Very static approach*



# Graph Learning: Embedding

## Internals

A. Multi-hop neighborhood sampling




B. Random walk-based node neighborhood sampling




Xu, Mengjia. "Understanding graph embedding methods and their applications." SIAM Review 63.4 (2021): 825-853.

# Graph learning with GNN

## Unsupervised Detection



*t-SNE on scene15 dataset*




GNN

- Process is very specific to each problem
- Graph extraction adds complexity
- Ad hoc Graph learning layer !!





# Yet another application: Phishing detection


<https://github.com/TristanBilot/phishGNN>



Graph representation of two websites after crawling with depth=1. Graph on the left contains multiple children URLs already crawled in previous iterations so their children are inserted in the graph as nodes of depth 2. Graph on the right contains children URLs never crawled before. Node in dark blue is the root URL, nodes in cyan and yellow are respectively URLs from the same domain and different domain, while red nodes are URLs returning an error code (HTTP status not in range 200-299)



Embeddings of two models trained on our dataset. GCN2 without PhishGNN framework (left) and with PhishGNN framework (right). Green: Benign; Red: Phishing



	Benign	Phishing	Total
Benign	688	3	691
Phishing	2	802	804
Total	690	805	1495

Confusion matrix for a test set of 1495 examples




Classification accuracies between traditional Machine Learning methods, GCN and PhishGNN

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# Learning

# Learning with human feedback

## Attack graphs as daemon detectors



Morwilog



- Stochastic process
- Enables to push the border of noiseless detection
- Relies on feedback from human operator, for instance through a dedicated monitoring tool



J. Navarro, A. Deruyver, P. Parrend, Morwilog: an ACO-based System for Outlining Multi-Step Attacks, IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (IEEE SSCI 2016), Athènes, Greece, décembre 2016

# Learning autonomously

Unsupervised learning with isolation forrests and community features



V1:


- Difficulty dissociating attacks from other data by score
- Most attacks remain a minority in their detection score range

V2:

- Highest detection scores are attacks only
- Most attacks are majority in their detection score range

# Learning autonomously

## Handling False Positives



# Leveraging graphs for learning novels attacks

- Reinforcement through human feedback
- Unsupervised learning through discriminating features
- False positive reduction through suitable scoring


A necessary – and efficient ! – step towards explainable attack detection on heterogeneous networks




# Conclusion

# Learning with trust


**Decision trees**



KDD99 attack classes




**Machine learning**



**Graph learning**

# Graph learning proves to be performant for key issues in modeling, detection and learning



Thanks !!

